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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 2 JANUARY, 1965 NUMBER I
CIVIL LIBEL AND SLANDER IN OKLAHOMA
John W. Hager*
Who steals my purse steals trash ... but he that filches from me my good
name robs me of that which not enriches him and makes me poor indeed.
Othello (Act III, Scene III)
On April 14, 1962, in the course of a public interview conducted by
Edmond N. Cahn,' the following question was asked of Justice Hugo
Black of the United States Supreme Court: "Do you make an exception
in freedom of speech and press for the law of defamation? That is, are you
willing to allow people to sue for damages when they are subjected to
libel or slander?" In his usual forthright and unequivocal manner Justice
Black replied:
'My view of the First Amendment, as originally ratified, is that
it said Congress should pass none of these kinds of laws. As written
at that time, the Amendment applied only to Congress. I have no
doubt myself that the provisions, as written and adopted, intended
that there should be no libel or defamation law in the United States
under the United States Government, just absolutely none so far as
I am concerned.
That is, no federal law. At that time - I will have to state this
in order to let you know what I think about libel and defamation-
people were afraid of the new Federal Government. I hope that they
have not wholly lost that fear up to this time because, while govern-
ment is a wonderful and an essential thing in order to have any kind
of liberty, order or peace, it has such power that people must always
remember to check them here and balance them there and limit
them here in order to see that you do not lose too much liberty in
exchange for government. So I have no doubt about what the Amend-
ment intended. As a matter of fact, shortly after the Constitution was
written, a man named St. George Tucker, a great friend of Madison's,
who served as one of the Commissioners at the Annapolis convention
- B.A. 1949, LL.B. 1950, University of Oklahoma; LL.M. 1964, New York
University; member of the Oklahoma Bar Association, the American Bar Association,
Scribes, and the Amercian Judicature Society; Mr. Hager is presently a Professor
of Law at the University of Tulsa.
'Professor of Law, New York University; author of The Sense of Injustice(1949); The Mforal Decision (1955); The Predicament of Democratic Man(1962). (After this article was written, Prof. Cahn met an untimely death in
August, 1964.)
1
Hager: Civil Libel and Slander in Oklahoma
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1965
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
of 1786 which first attempted to fill the need for a national consti-
tution, put out a revised edition of Blackstone. In it he explained
what our Constitution meant with reference to freedom of speech
and press. He said there was no doubt in his mind, as one of the
earliest participants in the development of the Constitution, that it
was intended that there should be no libel under the laws of the
United States. Lawyers might profit from consulting Tucker's edition
of Blackstone on that subject.
As far as public libel is concerned, or seditious libel, I have been
very much disturbed sometimes to see that there is present an idea
that because we have had the practice of suing individuals for libel,
seditious libel still remains for the use of government in this country.
Seditious libel, as it has been put into practice throughout the
centuries, is nothing in the world except the prosecution of people
who are on the wrong side politically; they have said something and
their group has lost and they are prosecuted. Those of you who read
the newspaper see that this is happening all over the world now,
every week somewhere. Somebody gets out, somebody else gets in,
they call a military court or a special commission, and they try him.
When he gets through sometimes he is not living.
My belief is that the First Amendment was made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth. I do not hesitate, so far as my own view
is concerned, as to what should be and what I hope will sometime
be the constitutional doctrine that just as it was not intended to
authorize damage suits for mere words as distinguished from conduct
as far as the Federal Government is concerned, the same rule should
apply to the states....
I believe with Jefferson that it is time enough for government to
step in to regulate people when they do something, not when they
say something, and I do not believe myself that there is any halfway
ground if you enforce the protections of the First Amendment
Until that improbable time arrives when the United States Supreme
Court agrees with Justice Black and holds that all federal and state
defamation laws violate the United States Constitution, we shall continue
to be plagued with the multitudinous problems which began with the
bifurcation of dafamation into libel, over which the Court of Star Chamber
generally had jurisdiction, and slander, which was determined by the
Ecclesiastical Courts. It would seem that courts and legislatures prefer
the more moderate views of Shakespeare and Justice Holmes,' and will
continue to add technicality to technicality and heap absurdity upon the
ever-increasing pile of absurdities. Oklahoma, perhaps, has been no worse
than the other states in this regard, but neither has it been any better.
2Black, One Man's Stand for Freedom, 476-477 (1963); 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
557-558 (1962).
3Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 Sup.Ct. 249 (1919).
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In this article V hope to give the reader a survey and sometimes
critical analysis of the law of libel and slander in Oklahoma as such law
is reflected in the Constitution, the statutes, and the cases, leaving for a
later article perhaps some suggested and badly needed changes in our law
of defamation. Some such article as this seems timely. For a long time
there were comparatively few actions brought for defamation, but it
would appear from newspaper reports (most cases not yet having reached
the case reports) that within the past few years there has been a great
increase in the number of defamation cases filed both in Oklahoma and
in the other states, and a corresponding increase in the amount of
damages sought by the plaintiffs.
The twin torts of defamation, libel and slander, will be treated
separately herein except where doing so would result in unnecessary
duplication of analysis and discussion.
LIBEL
Unlike most tort actions in Oklahoma which are creatures of common
law, both libel and slander actions are authorized and regulated by statutes
and by a few constitutional provisions. Civil libel is defined in Section
1441 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) as follows:
Libel is a false or malicious unprivileged publication by writing,
printing, picture, or effigy or other fixed representation to the eye,
which exposes any person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or
obloquy, or which tends to deprive him of public confidence, or to
injure him in his occupation, or any malicious publication as afore-
said, designed to blacken or vilify the memory of one who is dead,
and tending to scandalize his surviving relatives or friends.
That definition was copied directly and exactly from the statute
defining the crime of libel! Whatever may have been the motive of the
Legislature in making the criminal and civil definitions of libel identical,
the definition supra has created troublesome problems for the trial and
appellate courts, some of which problems the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has resolved to the satisfaction of no one, unless it be a winning party.
Inherent in the definition are other problems which continue to disturb
law students, law professors, attorneys, trial judges, and perhaps even
Supreme Court justices who may one day be called upon for definitive
resolutions to these problems. Under appropriate headings these semantic
and other difficulties in the quoted definition will be explored.
I. PARTIES TO AN ACTION
A. PLAINTIFFS
1. NATuRAL PERsoNs
There can be no doubt that any living person can maintain an action
for either libel or slander. But may such an action be maintained on
4 To those who object to my use of the first-person pronoun I would answer
with the following: "In some previous books, I shunned the first-person pronoun,
saying 'the writer' when I meant I,' on the assumption that the indirect locution
signified modesty. That asumption now seems to me a mistake. To say T removes
a false impression of a Jovian aloofness...F. Franks, Courts on Tfial, Preface
(1949).
s21 OKLA. STAT. § 771 (1961).
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behalf of a deceased person? At first glance the Oklahoma Abatement
Statute' would appear to answer the question unequivocally and negatively.
That statute provides in part: "No action pending in any court shall abate
by the death of either or both the parties thereto, except an action for
libel, slander...". In Alles v. Interstate Power Co..' the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that a civil action for libel did not survive where the plaintiff
died before judgment. Note, however, that the question originally posed
encompasses two distinct factual situations: (1) a plaintiff is defamed but
dies while his action for libel or slander is pending; (2) a person dies and
is defamed thereafter. The Abatement Statute and the Alles decision
answer only the first factual situation. It would perhaps be ridiculous to
raise the second factual situation in any common law jurisdiction and it
would be equally ridiculous to raise it in Oklahom were it not for that
troublesome language in the latter part of Section 1441 defining libel.
That language, it will be remembered, is as follows: ". . . or any malicious
publication as aforesaid, designed to blacken or vilify the memory of one
who is dead, and tending to scandalize his surviving relatives or friends."
One can only speculate on the legislative intent (or lack of intent) in
including this language. Three possibilities are suggested: (1) the Legisla-
ture copied this language from the criminal definition without realizing
any possible import on civil litigation; (2) the Legislature intended to
provide an action on behalf of one defamed after his death; (3) the
Legislature intended to provide an action on behalf of surviving relatives
and friends where the publication, defamatory of the dead, indirectly
defamed such relatives or friends. I believe, for reasons indicated here-
after, that the first named possibility is the most probable, particularly if
one employs Occham's razor in his analysis, the third possibility is the
next most probable, and the second suggested possibility is the least
logical and least probable. I will discuss these suggested possibilities in
inverse order. Had the Legislature intended to provide an action on
behalf of surviving relatives and friends where the defamation of the dead
indirectly defamed such relatives or friends, it would have done a vain
and useless thing. (Not at all unusual with Legislatures, but I believe the
verdict in this instance should be "not guilty.") Whether the defamation
comes about directly or indirectly makes no difference on the existence
of a cause of action, and such surviving relatives or friends are granted
full right to maintain a libel action by the language of Section 1441
preceding that portion which refers to one who is dead. That the Legisla-
ture did not intend to grant a cause of action on behalf of one defamed
after his death seems clear on at least four points: (1) the common law
tradition denying such an action; (2) the theory behind the Abatement
Statute inveighs against such interpretation; (3) the concluding words of
the statute, "and tending to scandalize his surviving relatives or friends,"
would have no relation to the reputation of the deceased; (4) the words
any malicious publication as aforesaid" could apply to a deceased person
in only one of the statutory ways a person can be defamed. A malicious
publication about a deceased person obviously could not tend to deprive
612 OKLA. STAT. § 1052 (1961).
7176 Okla. 252, 55 P.2d 751 (1936).
[Vol 2, No. I
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him of public confidence nor tend to injure him in his occupation. It
could only expose his reputation to "public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy." The troublesome language referred to earlier seems entirely in
context in the criminal definition, and I believe the Legislature meant the
word "scandalize" to mean "shock" or "anger" rather than to mean
"defame." For the reasons given, I believe the Legislature either inadver-
tently or unthinkingly carried over into the civil definition language which
is out of context there. No civil case of libel based upon that language
has reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court The question, however, was
presented in a case8 brought in the Federal District Court of the Northern
District of Oklahoma. Judge Kennamer, in sustaining defendant's motion
to dismiss, said:
The only question presented is whether one who falsely, and
without privilege so to do, publishes libelous matter of a deceased
person, is liable to the estate of said person or to his relatives
in the opinion no authority of Oklahoma's highest court is cited (as there
was none), and the Judge, whom I believe correct in his decision, begged
the question in his reasoning. He said:
Unless an Oklahoma statute provides for liability in such a case,
there can be no action for the recovery of damages for libeling a
deceased person.1"
The above Section cannot be construed as creating a cause of
action, but is merely a definition of libel'
At common law no recovery was possible by relatives or the
estate of a deceased person who had been libelled, and Oklahoma
is without any statute expressly creating a right of recovery or
changing common law with respect thereto.12
The decision, while highly persuasive, is not binding on the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and the essential question raised remains without any
definitive answer.
2. GROUP DEFAMATION
One troublesome problem on who may maintain an action for libel
or slander, the right of a member of a group or class'" to sue in his own
behalf, has been resolved partially in Oklahoma by the recent case of
Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris.'" Before discussing this aspect of what
is truly a revolutionary and significant decision, I should like to illustrate
briefly by a few quotations and remarks the problem confronting other
jurisdictions. The rule that no person who is a member of a large class
which has been defamed, and who is not identified individually in the
8 Turner v. Crime Detective, 34 F.Supp. 8, (N.D. Okla. 1940).
9Ibid.
10 Ibid.
" Id. at 9.12 Ibid.
73 Technically, there is a distinction between a "group" and a "class," but no
such distinction will be made in this article. Neither will the discussion concern
"class suits," the action being maintained by one or more individuals on behalf
of themselves and other members of a class.74377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962); Afhirmed without opinion, 376 U.S. 513.
1965)
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publication, can maintain an action appears to have had its origin in the
ancient case of King v. Alme & Nott, s wherein it was said:
Where a writing inveighs against mankind in general or against a
particular order of men, as for instance men of the gown, this is not
libel, but it must descend to particulars and individuals to make it
libel.
"As an overall consequence of the Alme & Nott precedent, recovery today
for defamation is dependent on the sheer size of the group. On the
average, any number over twenty is too large."'" The ironical thing about
this heritage from the common law, as is true in many similar instances,
is that the case does not stand for the rule for which the case is cited as
authority. Alme & Nott was a case of criminal libel, and the indictment
was set aside, not because a large group had been libeled, but because the
jurors were unable to determine from the proof who, if anyone, had been
defamed. It was said recently:
The courts are fairly uniform in denying recovery to any person
who seeks damages simply on the basis that he was a member of a
class.,,
The ability to show the court that he was sufficiently identified by
the publication will determine the individuals success."8
The court, in sustaining a motion to dismiss, in Fowler v. Curtis Publish-
ing Co." said much the same thing in these words:
In case of a defamatory publication directed against a class, with-
out in any way identifying any specific individual, no individual
member of the group has any redress . . . The only exception
involves cases in which the phraseology of a defamatory publication
directed at a small group is such as to apply to every member of the
class without exception.Y
Until the Fawcett case, recovery by one or more plaintiffs for defamation
leveled at a large group was restricted to civil law jurisdictions. In Orten-
berg v. Plamandon,2' seventy-five families of Jewish faith out of a total
population of 80,000 were permitted to recover on the basis of a defama-
tory lecture which generally traduced the Jewish religion. In 1949 a law
school classmate' of mine wrote a note in 2 Okla. L Rev. 377, 378,
which became a prophecy of what the Oklahoma Supreme Court did in
the Fawcett case concerning group defamation. This classmate wrote:
In cases where the group libeled may be easily recognized by the
public, by virtue of being confined to a certain geographical area, it
seems unjust to deny an action to a member of a group because the
153 Salk. 224, 91 Eng.Rep. 790 (1700); also found as Rex v. Orme & Nutt,
Trin. 11 Will. 3, B.R. 1 Ld. Raym. 486, 91 Eng.Rep. 1224 (1700).
16Brown and Stern, Group Defamation in the U.S.A., 13 CLiv.-MAR. LRnv.
7, 12 (1964).
17 Note, 17 U. MIAmIL.REv. 519, 522 (1963).
111d. at 519.19 78 F.Sup .303 (D. D.C. 1948).
2o Id. at 304.
2124 QUE.L.REV. 69 (1914), 35 CAN. L. T. 262 (1915) (Civil lawjurisdiction).jstRalph C. Thomas, now Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa.
[Vol 2, No. I
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libel is worded so as to apply impartially to the members of the
group. As the basis for an action for libel is injury to reputation, the
determining factor should be whether this plaintiff's reputation has
suffered, rather than whether his identity can be found to have been
spelled out by the words of the libel It should be for a jury to
determine whether, in fact, the plaintiff would be prejudiced in the
eyes of a reasonable man because he was one of a group at which a
libel, written in general and impartial terms, has been directed.
What did the Fawcett decision do to the ideas expressed in the fore-
going quotations and how did it resolve for Oklahoma the problem of
group defamation? First, a few background facts are necessary to an
understanding of the answer. In 1958 the defendent published an article
in True Magazine which accused the 1956 Oklahoma University football
team of using amphetamine and similar drugs to "promote aggression,
increase the competitive spirit, and work the same as the epinephrine
(adrenalin) produced in your body." Plaintiff was one of some sixty or
seventy members on the 1956 team. Neither he nor any other player was
identified specifically in the article. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the trial court instructed the jury to return a verdict against Fawcett
Publications. The verdict returned was for $75,000 actual damages (plain-
tiff had prayed for general damages in the amount of $100,000 and puni-
tive damages in the amount of $50,000 in his petition). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below, and made a thorough
examination of one of defendant's major grounds of appeal, to-witt; "(D)
Plaintiff is a member of a large and changing group class and therefore
the article is not libel per se." In answer to the defendant's contention
the court said:
The additional and final legal argument presented under Fawcett's
second proposition is that a defamatory publication concerning a
large group is not libelous per se as to an unnamed member of that
group. In this connection it appears that the courts have generally
held that defamatory words used broadly in respect to a large class
or group will not support a libel action by an individual member of
that group?'
While there is substantial precedent from other jurisdictions to
the effect that a member of a "large group" may not recover in an
individual action for a libelous publication unless he is referred to
personally, we have found no substantial reason why size alone should
be conclusive. We are not inclined to follow such a rule where, as
here, the complaining member of the group is as well known and
identified in connection with the group as was the plaintiff in this
case.
Despite the apparently unreserved language concerning the old rule about
group defamation, it should be noted that while the court did hold that
size alone should not be conclusive on one's right to sue, it followed this
with the further statement:
We are not inclined to follow such a rule where, as here, the
2 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 50 (Okla. 1962).2 1d. at 51-52.
19651
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complaining member of the group is as well known and identified
in connection with the group as was the plaintiff in this case.
Perhaps that language is not a restriction on the rule concerning the right
of a group member to sue for defamation of a large group, but is merely
explanatory that plaintiff has met his burden of showing that the article
had particular application to him, which would be a requirement in any
defamation case. (As there were sixty to seventy members on the 1956
football team, most of whom were less well known to the public, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court may have fifty-nine to sixty-nine further oppor-
tunities to explain its quoted language.) It should be noted also that the
case did not involve, and the court did not decide, what the result would
have been had the defamatory language been other than all-inclusive. In
this connection the court said:
Fawcett also refers to Owens v. Clark (1931) 154 Ol. 108, 6
P.2d 755.... It will be observed that the libelous article in the
Owens case dealt with "certain members" of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court and not all of its members. Without attempting to defend the
Owens case we do observe that it is distinguishable from the case
now under consideration. * 0. *
One obvious distinction between the Owens case and the instant
case is that the article by Fawcett in True Magazine is leveled at the
entire team.5
Now that the United States Supreme Court has decided the Fawcett case,
Oklahoma lawyers might well remember these words:
It will be as well for the future for lawyers to concentrate on the
question whether the words were published of the plaintiff rather
than on the question whether they were spoken of a class?6
3. CoRaORATioNs
No Oklahoma appellate cases were found in which a corporation,
either one operated for profit or a charitable one, had brought an action
for libel against it as a legal entity, as opposed to libel of individual
officers, directors, or managers of the corporation. Assuming for the
moment that Oklahoma law permits a corporation to maintain such an
action, there are several possible reasons why a corporation has not done
so. Some of the possibilities are: (1) the usual libel, although perhaps
aimed at a corporation, defames one or more officials of the corporation
and any action would be brought in their names as plaintiffs as they
would be the real parties in interest; (2) the reputation of a corporation,
unless perhaps it be a very small organization, ordinarily would not be
damaged enough to warrant the expense, trouble, and publicity of a trial;
(3) the remedy of money damages, often ineffective even with private
individuals, would not be an efficacious way to restore public confidence
in the corporation. Advertising and other self-help remedies would be far
more effective.
The constitutional and statutory provisions give no definitive answer
to the issue of a corporation's power to sue for a libel directed against it.
Section 1.19 of Title 18 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) provides in part:
21 Id. at 49-50.26Knuffer v. London Express Newspapers, Ltd., (1944) A.C. 116, 122.
[Vol. 2, No. 1
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Every domestic corporation shall, in so far as incidental to the
transaction of its business or expedient for the attainment of its
purposes stated in its articles of incorporation, have and possess the
following general powers:
(1) To sue and be sued in its corporate name....
A strict construction of that statutory grant of power woud seem to deny
to a corporation the right to maintain a libel action. Such action would
not be, in any meaningful sense, "incidental to the transaction of its
business." However, it could be argued with greater force that a libel
action is "expedient for the attainment of its purposes stated in its articles
of incorporation." Common sense and logic would seem to dictate that
this section neither grants nor denies to a corporation the power to main-
tain an action for libel but is merely procedural That is, the section
merely designates the name by which a corporation may bring an action.
Such interpretation is strengthened by the fact that corporations undoubt-
edly may be sued for libel, and the section quoted also says every domestic
corporation shall have the power to be sued in its corporate name. By no
stretch of the imagination could a libel suit against a corporation be
"incidental to the transaction of its business or expedient for the attain-
ment of its purposes stated in its articles of incorporation."
In the Oklahoma Constitution it is provided:
The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person,
and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for
every injury to person, property, or reputation....
Every person may freely speak, write, or publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right....
Although these provisions, as well as the statutes2 on libel, refer to "every
person," such designation would not exclude corporations necessarily. As
corporations can be sued for libel and thus fall within the meaning of
"person" in the constitutional provision making one responsible for the
abuse of the right to free speech, then, a fortiori, corporations should fall
within the meaning of "person" in the constitutional provision granting
a remedy for injury to reputation.
4. PART m s'S
As was true with the question of whether a corporation could be a
plaintiff in a libel action, no appellate court cases were found in which a
partnership had brought an action for a libel against its reputation, as
opposed to a libel of one or more of the individual partners. Whether a
partnership has a cause of action for libel of the business association itself
is perhaps a moot question, as it would be a very rare instance where a
libel damaged the reputation of a partnership without also damaging the
reputation of the individual partners. In the latter instance the partners
would sue as individuals as they would be the real parties in interest.
As two writers have observed:
At common law, a partnership could neither sue nor be sued in
the partnership name. All members had to join as parties plaintiff
2 7OKLA. CONST. ART. 2, § 6.
2 OKLA. CONST. ART. 2, § 22.
29E.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1441 (1961).
19651
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and be named as parties defendant. Oklahoma follows the common
law in actions brought by the partnerships...
As has been suggested previously in connection with corporations,
but with far less force in this instance, perhaps the rule quoted neither
grants nor denies a partnership power to maintain a libel action, but is
merely a rule of procedure as to the name by which a partnership may sue
or be sued. It is very doubtful, however, that a partnership could maintain
an action for libel directed against the business reputation of the associa-
tion.
B. DEFENDANTS
In the discussion in the foregoing section regarding who may be a
party plaintiff, it was pointed out that any natural person may sue,
corporations may be sued for libel in their corporate names, and partner-
ships must be sued by naming the individual partners as defendants. The
only real problem concerning defendants as parties to a libel action is the
liability, if any, of a defendant who plays merely a secondary role in the
publication of the libel. That is, a party who does not originate the libel
but is merely a middleman through whose hands the libel passes from the
originator to the persons receiving it.
Libel is considered as a tort based upon a theory of liability without
fault, and neither the lack of intent to defame nor absence of negligence
is regarded as a defense. This harsh rule has been ameliorated to some
extent in Oklahoma. Television and radio personnel are favored by an Act
passed by the 1957 Legislature, which Act provides:
The owner, licensee or operator of a television and/or radio
broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or em-
ployes of any such owner, licensee or operator, shall not be liable for
any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in
or as a part of a television and/or radio broadcast, by one other than
such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless
it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, that such
owner, licensee, operator or such agent or employee, has failed to
exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such
statement in such broadcast.
31
So far, no cases have reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court concerning
this Act. Consequently, it is not known what constitutes "due care," nor
whether this statue violates the Oklahoma Constitution which provides:
The Legislature shall pass no law granting to any association,
corporation, or individual any exclusive rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties within this State.?'
Other jurisdictions have reached the same result by judicial decision
as that set out in the Oklahoma statute. In Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 3 the liability of a broadcasting company was limited to
3OBandy and Elkouri, The Uniform Partnership Act, 9 OKLA. L. RMn. 377,
379 (1956).3112 OKLA. STAT. § 1447.1 (1961). Liability for political broadcasts will be
discussed at a later point in this article.
2 OKLA. CONST. ART. 5, § 51.
33 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302, 124 A.LR. 968 (1939).
['Vol 2, No. I
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defamation resulting from the negligence of its servants. The rule was
followed in Kelly v. Hoffman.' In that case the plaintiff alleged that
defendant owned and operated a radio station over which a news an-
nouncer, not a servant of defendant's, defamed the plaintiff. On a motion
to strike portions of the petition, the court held that defendant was not
liable for the defamation if it could not have prevented the publication
by the exercise of reasonable care. Such favoritism of defendant broad-
casters is not without criticism. As one person wrote:
It would seem, therefore, that the equities of the parties should
control, in which case the rule of limited liability.. . should not be
followed. A return to the absolute liability doctrine of the earlier
cases would be most in accord with the equities of the parties and
with the general body of law usually applied in the fields of defama-
tion and extra-hazardous activities.O
But what of Oklahoma defendants who are not so favored by statute?
In World Pub. Co. v. Minahan,6 where the managing editor of a news-
paper was an officer of the corporation owning the newspaper and in
active charge of the management, control, and policy of the paper, the
editor was held equally liable with the owner for the publication of a
libelous article. In Jackson v. Little,' a railroad superintendent who had
authorized his chief clerk to write a letter concerning an employee, who
suggested certain statements to include in the letter, and who signed his
name thereto, was held liable along with the clerk for the libelous matter
in the letter. In another case' defendant was held liable for defamation
published in its newspaper although the published words had been ob-
tained from a nation-wide newsgathering service and were published in
good faith. It can be argued that none of these decisions is definitive on
the issue of liability of one who plays merely a secondary role in the
publication of the libel as in all three cases, the defendant played a more
active role than that of a mere distributor. A definitive answer to a part
of the question was supplied by the previously discussed case of Fawcett
Publications, Inc. v. Morris." In addition to naming as defendant the
publisher of True Magazine in which the defamatory article appeared,
plaintiff sued Mid-Continent News Company, the Oklahoma distributor
for Fawcett's publications. The trial court sustained the distributor's
motion for a directed verdict in its favor. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
affirmed this portion of the judgment with very little discussion. In
connection with another argument by defendant Fawcetr Publications, the
court said: ". . . we are forced to the conclusion that for all practical pur-
poses Mid-Continent was little more than a mere conduit.. On the
issue raised by plaintiff on appeal, the court said:
The record does not show, as contended by plaintiff, that Mid-
Continent had knowledge of the article prior to its distribution and
3461 A.2d 143 (N.J. 1948).
"Note, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 259 (1949).
3670 Okla. 107, 173 P. 815, L.R.A. 1918F, 283 (1918).
37 110 Okla. 70, 236 P. 392 (1925).
-1 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Givens, 67 F.2d 62 (10th dr. 1933).
19 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962).
" Id. at 46.
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we are unable to conclude from the argument that the trial court
erred in directing a verdict for Mid-Continent. 41
It seems clear from this decision that in Oklahoma, the rule is that
a mere distributor of a libelous publication is not liable where he had no
knowledge that the publication contained a libel before he distributed it.
Note, however, that the court did not decide what would be the liability,
if any, of a mere distributor who should have known of the libel or was
negligent in not discovering it. For the time being this is an open question
in Oklahoma.
I. ELEMENTS, PROOF, AND DEFENSES
A. ELEMENTS AND PROOF BY PLAINTIFF42
The appropriate statutes would indicate that a plaintiff need plead
and prove very little to state and make out a prima facie case for libel or
slander. Section 303 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) provides:
In an action for libel or slander, it shall be sufficient to state,
generally, that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of the
plaintiff; and if the allegation be denied, the plaintiff must prove, on
the trial, the facts, showing that the defamatory matter was published
or spoken of him.
The section on pleading in the chapter on Libel and Slander is very
similar and provides as follows:
In all civil actions to recover damages for libel or slander, it shall
be sufficient to state generally what the defamatory matter was, and
that it was published or spoken of the plaintiff, and to allege any
general or special damage caused thereby, and the plaintiff to recover
shall only be held to prove that the matter was published or spoken
by the defendant concerning the plaintiff.!3
To plead a prima facie case of libel or slander the quoted statutes
would require the plaintiff to establish only four elements (reserving a
discussion of damages until a later point): (1) publication; (2) of defama-
tory matter; (3) about the plaintiff; and (4) by the defendant. Let us not,
however, be misled; plaintiff's task of getting to trial is not all that easy.
1. PUBLICATION
As was true at common law, the statutory meaning of publication is
not the restricted one assigned to it by a layman. For example, a layman
would not consider the exhibition of a picture or an effigy as a "publica-
tion." Publication is the communication of the alleged libel, whatever
form such libel may take, to at least one person other than the plaintiff.
That the Legislature meant publication in the common law sense seems
clear from reading the civil definition of libel In Section 1441 of Title
12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961), it is provided in part: "Libel is a
false or malicious unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture.
." The use of the word "publication" would be redundant had not the
Legislature intended to mean communication. In Oklahoma the element
41 Id. at 54.
2 Because of their importance in Oklahoma law, Libel Per Se, Libel Per Quod,
and Damages will be discussed separately in sections following this one.
4 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1444 (1961).
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of publication rarely is denied, and the defendant relies instead on one
or more of the several defenses available to him.
Whether consent to a tort is a defense on the ground that usually
the issue is raised by the defendant, or is not a true defense as it negatives
the existence of the tort in the first instance will not be discussed herein.
Let it suffice to say that a plaintiff fails to meet the element of publication
if he, personally or through his agent, is the party who makes known the
libelous matter. In Taylor v. McDaniels," the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that there was no actionable publication where the plaintiff's agent,
at plaintiff's request, exhibited to others the alleged libelous matter. As
there are no appellate court cases, it is an open question in Oklahoma
whether publication by plaintiff as a matter of necessity would be action-
able. For example, the plaintiff finds it necessary to show the libelous
matter to another because he is immature, blind, illiterate, unable to read
the English language, etc. It is suggested that a trial court should overrule
any demurrer based on such facts and leave to the jury the question
whether such publication was reasonably necessary under the particular
circumstances.
Oklahoma has not answered the intriguing question whether it is a
publication for an employer to dictate to his secretary a letter which
libels the plaintiff, which letter is transcribed and sent to the plaintiff.
Is the secretary a person or a machine? An analogy might be drawn to
the situation in the slander case of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Davidson,
where the court held there was no publication when the defamatory words
regarding a discharged employee were spoken by supervisory employees
in the presence and hearing of a fellow employee.
2. DEFAMATORY MATrER
It is not sufficient that plaintiff show a publication of just any
defamatory matter. The defamatory matter must meet the statutory defini-
tion of libel, a question of law for the court. It must be in the form of a
"writing, printing, picture or effigy or other fixed representation to the
eye." All the listed forms of libel, except the last one, are clear and their
meanings unmistakable. In Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital," the Okla-
homa Supreme Court, while conceding that numerous authorities could
be cited on either side as to the legislative intent in including the categoryIor other fixed representation to the eye," followed what it referred to as
"the well known rule of statutory construction" and held that the quoted
phrase refers to the same general nature or class of libels as those specific-
ally enumerated. It is interesting to speculate whether defamation by
means of television constitutes "a fixed representation to the eye." A
libel case brought for defamation which had occured by that medium of
communication would raise such questions as: (1) are the electronic
impulses which form the picture "fixed," and would this turn on whether
the offending picture was a fleeting one or stayed on the screen for a
longer time? (2) Is television within the same general nature or class as
a writing, printing, picture, or effigy?
4139 Okla. 262, 281 P. 967, 66 A.L.R. 1246 (1929).
4s194 Okla. 115, 148 P.2d 468 (1944); see also Collins v. Oklahoma State
Hospital, 76 Okla. 229, 184 P. 946, 7 A.L.R. 895 (1919).
46 76 Ola. 229, 184 P. 946, 7 A.LR. 895 (1919).
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Assuming a situation where a plaintiff would not have to prove that
his reputation was in face damaged (i.e., a case of libel per se), a literal
reading of the statutory definition of libel would eliminate the necessity
of a plaintiff having to allege or prove his reputation was actually affected
in any way. He need show only that the publication "exposes" him to
public hatred, etc., or "tends" to deprive him of public confidence, etc.
It must be remembered that this definition of civil libel was copied
verbatim from the Criminal Code, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
recognizing that libel is a tort which in fact damages one's reputation,
held in the Collins case that the alleged defamatory matter must be seen
or read by someone and a statutee to be discussed later indicates inferent-
ially that the publication must be injurious to the reputation.
Not only must the plaintiff allege and prove that the libel takes one
of the forms prescribed by statute, but he must show also that injury to
his reputation had one or more of the following effects: (1) it exposed
him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; (2) it deprived him
of public confidence; (3) it injured him in his occupation. As libel is an
injury to one's reputation, the determinative question on the existence of
a cause of action is objective, rather than subjective. That is, the question
is not what effect did the libel have on the mind of the plaintiff, but
what effect did it have on the minds of those persons to whom it was
communicated. Thus, it has been held that the fact that a publication is
unpleasant and annoys or irks the subject thereof, or subjects him to
jest or banter is not sufficient by itself to make the publication libelous. '
The following selected factual situations are listed to give some in-
dication of what the Oklahoma Supreme Court has regarded as libelous:
(1) accusing one of operating his business with "shady ethics" or on a
"sneak basis" is actionable;49 (2) imputing impairment of plaintiff's
mental faculties is libelous;' (3) it is libel to refer to a white person as
a Negro or as colored, or to use the abbreviation "col."; (4) an article
stating that a suit filed by plaintiff on the "pretence" of a back injury
was dismissed was held actionable; ' (5) it is libel to state that plaintiff
believes in disobedience to law and forcible appropriation of property;n
and (6) attributing to a Negro attorney words commonly used by the
more illiterate southern Negro is not libelous.0
3. ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF
Having shown that there was a publication of defamatory matter,
the plaintiff must allege and prove that such defamatory matter "was
4712 OKLA. STAT. § 1445 (1961).
4Wimmer v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 151 Okla. 123, 1 P.2d 671 (1931); Fire
v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 146 Okla. 150, 293 P. 1073 (1930); Phoenix Printing
Co. v. Robertson, 80 Okla. 191, 195 P. 487 (1921).49 Nichols v. Bristow Pub. Co., 330 P.2d 1044 (Okla. 1958).
50 Taylor v. McDaniels, 130 Okla. 262, 281 P. 967, 66 A.L.R. 1246 (1929).
51 Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635 (1928);
Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital, 76 Okla. 229, 184 P. 946, 7 A.L.R. 895(1919).52 Gentry v. Wagoner County Pub. Co., 351 P.2d 715 (Okla. 1960).
53 Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 P. 736, 51 A.L.R. 1066 (1927).
m Franklin v. World Pub. Co., 183 Okla. 507, 83 P.2d 401 (1938).
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published or spoken of" him as required by the statutes.' If the plaintiff
is not named in the libel or is not otherwise dearly identified, then he
must plead facts extrinsic to the libel to show he is the person defamed.
This particular averment has the technical name of "colloquium." It
should be noted carefully that this pleading may be necessary and can
be employed in any kind of libel case and it is not restricted to cases of
libel per se. Whether a particular libel is per se and whether the libel
refers to the plaintiff are entirely distinct questions. This was made dear
in National Ref. Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co.s 6 wherein the court
said:
Whether an article is of a libelous character per se, and whether
it has application to a particular party plaintiff, are entirely distinct
qestions, and should not be confused. The answer to the first ques-
tion is to be found in the article itself. The answer to the second
question is to be found in the proof supporting proper allegations in
the complaint. Those proofs may consist either of the article itself, or
of extrinsic evidence. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, to meet the requirements of this third element, the plaintiff can
prove the libel was published about him by: (1) showing he was named
in the publication; (2) showing that he was otherwise singled out and
identified in the libel; or (3) showing by extrinsic facts and circumstances
that persons to whom the libel was communicated believed it had ref-
erence to the plaintiff. In this latter connection, plaintiff's evidence in
the Fawcett case showed that many people asked him about the article.
The weakness of the plaintiff's evidence in showing the article was
published of him and a disagreement with the majority over what con-
stitutes libel per se caused Justice Halley to dissent in the case.u
4. BY THE DFENDANT
As we have seen from the previous discussion, a plaintiff may have
some trouble in pleading and proving that the matter was defamatory and
that it was about him, but rarely does a plaintiff have difficulty with the
element of publication. This is likewise true in showing that the de-
fendant is responsible for the publication. Nevertheless, there are some
matters about this last element of plaintiff's prima facie case which
deserve at least a cursory discussion.
First, the doctrine of respondeat superior applies as it does to other
tort actions. In German-American Ins. Co. v. Huntley," the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that a corporation is liable for defamation by its
officers, agents, or servants in the performance of, or within the scope
of their general duties.
Reverting once more to the difficulties and ambiguities caused by
the verbatim adoption of the criminal definition to define civil libel, and
looking at the wording in that statute alone, it would appear that in
two of the effects which libel may bring about, these effects would have
55 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 303, 1444 (1961).
56 20 F.2d 763, 55 A.LR. 406, quoted in Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris,
377 P.2d 42, 50 (Okla. 1962).
5 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 55 (Okla. 1962).
162 Okla. 39, 161 P. 815 (1916).
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to be public in nature. The statute speaks of exposing any person to
"public" hatred, etc., or depriving him of "public" confidence. To my
knowledge no issue has ever been raised concerning this question of the
libel having to be public. Perhaps this is because in nearly every instance,
the dissemination of the libel has been widespread enough to be termed
"public," but even more probable as an explanation is that the statutes 9
on what the plaintiff must plead make no reference to any necessity for
a public defamation. Whether the libel is communicated to but one per-
son or to many would seem important only on the amount of damages
recoverable.
In Spencer -v. Minnick, 41 Okla. 613, 139 P. 130 (1914), it was
held that a defendant cannot escape liability for a libelous publication
by using a question mark after the actionable language. Nor can a de-
fendant evade his responsibility by saying he "understood" that plaintiff
had committed perjury. By analogy, the publication is by the defendant
even though he names the source of his information, expresses dis-
belief in the truth of the libel, or uses words of qualification such as,
"it is rumored;" "I heard from a friend;" "it is being said," etc.
Must the publication, although undoubtedly made by the defendant,
be shown to have been made maliciously before plaintiff has a prima
fade case? The statutory definition speaks of a "malicious" publication,
implying that plaintiff must show this as an element. The court in
Craig v. Wright,6' however, said: "Malice is emphatically no part of a
plaintiff's cause of action for libel...."62 But in another case the same
court said:
In all cases of defamation, whether oral or written, malice is an
essential ingredient, and must be averred. But when averred, and
the language, verbal or written is proved, the law will infer
malice....
Section 1443 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) says in part:
"In all cases of publication of matter not privileged.... malice shall be
presumed from the publication, unless the fact and the testimony rebut
the same," and Section 1445 of the same Title says: "An injurious pub-
lication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive for
making it is shown." These various authorities, seemingly contradictory,
are reconciled if they mean, as I believe they do, that to plead a prima
facie case, plaintiff must allege malice, but he may prove this element
in most instances and establish his prima facie case by means of the
statutory presumption of malice.
B. LIBEL PER SE AND LIBEL PER QUOD
1. PLEADING SPECIAL DAMAGES
At common law a writing which was dearly defamatory on its face
was libelous per se, while if it were necessary for the plaintiff to plead
extrinsic matter to show the defamatory nature of the libel, then it
9 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 303, 1444 (1961).
6 (Slander case) Smith v. Gillis, 51 Okla. 134, 151 P. 869 (1915).61 169 Okla. 245, 43 P.2d 1017 (1934).621d. at 1019.
63Harris v. Rich, 104 Okla. 120, 229 P. 1080 (1924).
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was merely libel per quod. In neither situation did the common law rule
require allegation or proof of any special damages. While Oklahoma has
retained in essence the common law test for a libel per se, it has changed
the common law rule about special damages. The Oklahoma cases hold
that where a publication is not libelous per se, special damages must
be alleged and proved, and further, extrinsic matter may not be referred
to for the purpose of making the publication libelous per se. As one
writer said:
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has consistently made a dis-
tinction between publications that are libelous per se and libelous
per quod. There is no doubt that in order to recover, the latter
requires allegation and proof of special damages. Libel per se exists
where the words are defamatory on their face, and are recognized
as injurious without the aid of extrinsic proof. Libel per quod exists
when extrinsic facts are necessary to prove the imputation con-
veyed."
The question of whether a publication is libelous per se is a question
of law for the court.' The difficulty is that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has not laid down a definite guide for the trial courts to follow in de-
termining whether a libel is per se in one frequently occurring situation.
Words charged to be libelous fall into one of three classes: (1) those that
cannot possibly bear a defamatory meaning; (2) those that are reasonably
susceptible of a defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one; or
(3) those that are dearly defamatory on their face." The first class
clearly is not actionable and just as dearly, the third class is libelous per
se. But what of the second class? Here the Supreme Court suffers from
mental myopia or judicial schizophrenia. As one writer has correctly
observed:
... The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not been consistent
in applying a uniform test to determine this question. Two possible
tests which the courts may use are: (1) the court can hold that the
words are not libelous per se if the publication cannot be reasonably
capable of a defamatory meaning; otherwise, whether the statement
is libelous is a jury question; (2) if an innocent meaning is possible
the words are not libelous per se, and in the absence of allegations
of special damages, a demurrer will be sustained."'7
The same writer concluded: "It is submitted that the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma should clear up the inconsistency that presently exists and
state a definite test to be used in determining what is libel per se in
Oklahoma."
For a while it looked as if the Supreme Court were going to do
just that in the Fawcett case. The court said:
Having concluded that the article is defamatory and libelous
on its face we think it follows that the article is libelous per se. How-
" Note, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 474 (1957).
6S Kelly v. Roetzel, 64 Okla. 36, 165 P. 1150 (1917).
6See Wimmer v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 151 Okla. 123, 1 P.2d 671 (1931).
6 Note, 10 OxLA. L. Rav. 474, 475 (1957).
61Id. at 478.
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ever, in view of the prominence given to the subject of libel per se
in Fawcet's brief and its contention the plaintiff's name must ap-
pear in the face of the artide; and the superficial lack of harmony
in the decisions from this court on what constitutes libel per se,
we find it appropriate to consider the matter extensively.P
Unfortunately for our analysis and our search for an answer to the ques-
tion posed, after making the above quoted statement, the Supreme Court
considered "extensively" only the question of whether plaintiff must be
named and not the issue of what constitutes libel per se. This the court
did, despite having made very clear that these are two distinct questions.
It would appear we are left in doubt on the true nature of libel per se
in Oklahoma.
2. DAMAGES - SoME GENERAL RULEs
In defamation which is not per se the plaintiff must plead and
prove "special damages" as we have seen. But what is meant by the
phrase in the context of a defamation action? Does Oklahoma adopt
the technical meaning of the term, those damages which do not neces-
sarily flow from the wrong alleged," or the more restricted meaning of
actual pecuniary loss? Oklahoma has never answered the question defini-
tively. The history of libel and slander would seem to favor the latter
meaning. Whatever Oklahoma means by the term, it is clear that the
damages must be alleged with great specificity as opposed to the general
allegations permitted in the defamation per se cases."
The objection that, "The very nature of an action which prays for
damages, in a society where economic values dominate, implies failure in
the action if substantial damages be not awarded," has been answered
to some extent by the Oklahoma statuten providing for a minimum
recovery of one hundred dollars and costs. The objection, however, is
still valid to a large extent as the general public may have learned of
the alleged defamation of the plaintiff, but it is unlikely to hear of his
justification at the hands of a jury as the various news media seem
interested in reporting only cases where recovery is in the five or six
figure brackets.
The amount of damages awarded is limited only by the Oklahoma
rule that damages may not exceed the amount prayed for even though
the evidence adduced at trial might justify more money. There are no
other criteria and no other limitations. As has been said by McCormick:
Apart from the occasional traceable money loss recovered as
special damage, damages in defamation cases are measurable by no
standard which different men can use with like results. Amounts
of verdicts vary from nominal damages of a few cents to a fortune
in six figures, according to numberless factors, such as the age,
69 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 48 (Okla. 1962).
"
0McCormick, DAMAGES § 8 (1935).
71Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight, 174 Okla. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935); Owens
v. Clark, 154 Okla. 108, 6 P.2d 755 (1932); Wimmer v. Oklahoma Pub. Co.,
151 Okla. 123, 1 P.2d 671 (1931); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Gray, 138 Okla.
71, 280 P. 419 (1929).2 Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423, 428 (1952).
73 12 OKLA. STAT. 1446 (1961).
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sex, wealth, and personal attractiveness of the parties, the skill of
respective counsel, the pungency of the defaming words, and the
infinite variety of the experiences, sympathies, and prejudices of
the jurymen.74
In the Fawcett case the court followed what appears to many per-
sons to be an unfair rule when it said: "It is well settled that in an
action wherein punitive damages are proper, evidence of the financial
worth of the defendant is competent and admissible."'5 (Are jurors so
unsophisticated that such evidence, presumably to aid them in determin-
ing what amount of money will punish this particular defendant, will be
disregarded by them in assessing the compensatory damages? Allied to
that question and admittedly outside the scope of this article, but do
not compensatory damages also have a punitive role to play?)
C. DEFENSES
1. TRUTH
From personal conversations with judges and attorneys I have found
among them a common assumption (in which I formerly shared more
readily than now) that truth alone is a defense in Oklahoma to a civil
case of defamation. That is, if the defendant can establish the truth of
his defamatory statement, this is a defense regardless of the motive with
which he made his statement. This "rule" is doubtful. No constitutional
or statutory provision supplies any such rule in unequivocal language,
and no Oklahoma Supreme Court case has so held in clear, unambiguous
terms.
Article II, Section 22 of the Oklahoma Constitution, after providing
for the right of free speech and related matters, concludes with this
language:
In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matter
alleged to be libellous may be given in evidence to the jury, and
if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous
be true, and was written or published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.
Two interpretations are possible on the intent of the framers of the
Constitution in using that language: (1) the framers intended to make
certain that truth alone would not be a defense to a criminal libel, but
decided to leave to the Legislature the problem of what effect truth alone
should have in an action for civil defamation; (2) the framers intended
to leave truth as a defense to a civil action, but to add a qualification
where truth was pleaded in a criminal action. The Legislature unfortu-
nately has been just as ambiguous in its enactments. Section 304 of Title
12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) provides:
In the actions mentioned in the last section, the defendant may
allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and may prove
the same, and any mitigating circumstances, to reduce the amount
of damages, or he may prove either.
Here again, at least two reasonable interpretations of intent are possible:
74 M cCormick, DAmAGES 443 (1935).
7s Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 53 (Okla. 1962).
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(1) the Legislature intended to allow a defendant to plead truth as a
defense and to plead any mitigating circumstances to reduce the damages,
or he could plead one or the other at his discretion; (2) the Legislature
intended to allow defendant to plead truth and any other mitigating cir-
cumstances to reduce the amount of damages. Although the Oklahoma
legislators rarely are good grammarians, the addition of the comma
following the word "circumstances" would favor the second possibility.
The legislative history of this section, however, gives greater weight to
the first interpretation. Section 304 was taken from the Kansas statutes,76
a State with a constitutional provision very similar to Oklahoma's Article
II, Section 22. In both Castle v. Houstone7 and Munday v. Wright, the
Kansas Supreme Court held that a reasonable interpretation of their
constitutional and statutory provisions required it to hold that truth
alone was a complete defense in a civil action, but a defense in a criminal
action only when the truth was published with good motives.
Oklahoma Legislatures are known for either duplicating or provid-
ing parallel Acts to cover the same subject matter. So it is with pleading
defenses to a defamation action. Despite the existence of Section 304
providing for the pleadings by a defendant, the Legislature provided in
Section 1444 of Title 12, Oklahoma Statutes (1961) in part as follows:
As a defense thereto the defendant may deny and offer evidence
to disprove the charges made, or he may prove that the matter
charged as defamatory was true, and in addition thereto, that it was
published or spoken under such circumstances as to render it a
privileged communication.
Does the Legislature mean that a defendant has three possible defenses,
to-wit: (1) a defense of "I didn't do it"; (2) "I only told the truth"; or
(3) "I may have lied but I was privileged in doing so?" Or does the
Legislature mean that a defendant has three defenses and he can plead
any one of the three and/or the other two as well, the Legislature using
the ambiguous phrase "and in addition thereto" to avoid the awkward
and sometimes meaningless "and/or" designation? Logic and common
sense would dictate the second possibility. If a defendant can establish
that his communication is privileged (to be discussed hereafter), this is
a defense in itself and the truth or falsity of his publication is immaterial
It would seem an unreasonable interpletation which would require de-
fendant to show as a defense both the truth of what he said and also
that it was privileged. This analysis is strengthened by the definition of
libel which provides that it is a "false or malicious unprivileged publica-
tion." Thus, the defendant should be able to win by proving that his
statement was true or that it was without malice and privileged. The
most we can say is that some argument for the existence of truth alone
as a defense can be based on the constitutional and statutory language.
We cannot say that these authorities definitely establish this as the rule
in Oklahoma.
The cases are little more definitive than the legislative authorities.
76 GEN. ST. KAN. 1889, par. 4209.
7 19 Kan. 417, 27 Am.Rep. 127 (1877).7 26Kan. 173 (1881).
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Craig v. Wright" is most often quoted for the rule that truth is always
a defense. That rule, however, is not the true holding of the case and
its frequent quotation results from a misunderstanding of the procedural
steps in the case. The defendant admitted publication and pleaded in
defense only one ground, substantial truth of the import conveyed. The
trial court instructed the jury that "the truth of the article is always a
defense," and that "if the defendant establishes the truth of the alleged
libelous statement by fair preponderance of the evidence then plaintiff
cannot recover, and your verdict should be for the defendant."8 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, speaking about this instruction, said:
More serious objection is taken to the instruction because it
treats truth as an absolute defense to an action for libel. It is con-
tended that our statutory definition of "civil libel," section 724,
O.S. 1931, adopted from our criminal libel definition by the Revised
Laws of 1910 (Section 4956) states that, 'Libel is a false or ma-
licious unprivileged publication,' etc. and so negatives the idea
that falsity is essential"
The Supreme Court, however, did not have to answer the question of
whether truth alone is an absolute defense because the defendant's mo-
tive in defaming the plaintiff was not disputed, and the trial court held
as a matter of law that the motive was a justifiable one. This destroyed
the statutory presumption of malice, 2 raised an issue of conditional
privilege, and left to the plaintiff the task of proving malice. Thus, the
trial court's instruction (erroneously phrased but harmlessly so under
the facts of the case) dealt not with truth as an absolute defense, but
with the question of defendant's malice, which would have been shown
and his privilege lost under the particular circumstances of the case had
his statement been false.
In Spencer v. Minnick,' the Supreme Court implied that truth
alone is not an absolute defense in Oklahoma when it said: "The publi-
cation was not privileged, under the facts shown, and the defendant had
remaining .to him but the defense of 'truthful publication without malice'
as a complete defense....". Bodine v. Times-Journal Pub. Co.8" is of
no help in our analysis as both truth and privilege were involved and
entertwined in the case.
The cases concerning the defense of truth in Slander fall under the
same sections on pleading as Libel, but in one slander case to be men-
tioned shortly, the court seems more lenient in saying that truth is an
absolute defense than it has in the libel cases. This despite the fact that
the definition of slander begins, "Slander is a false 'and unprivileged
publication"8 (emphasis added) while the definition of libel begins,
'libel is a false or malicious unprivileged publication."' (emphasis
"169 Okla. 245, 43 P.2d 1017 (1934).
80 Id. at 1018.81 Ibi.
82 OKLA. STAT. § 1445 (1961).
'341 Okla. 613, 139 P. 130 (1913).
84Id. at 132.
8526 Okla. 135, 110 P. 1096 (1910).
8612 OKLA. STAT. § 1442 (1961).
" 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1441 (1961).
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added.) In Weber v. Ruscb,n the court said:
Under section 304, supra, the general denial is provided for.
Under section 305, supra, the special defense of truth as a justifica-
tion is provided for, and the defendant by his answer had the right,
under proper allegations, to raise both propositions, although they
are inconsistent defenses, as was decided by this court in an opinion
by Justice Hayes in the case of Wallace v. Kopenbrink, 119 P. 579
31 Oki. 26. The first paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:
In an action for slander, the defendant, by reason of sections 5634
and 5666, Comp. Laws 1909, may set up in his answer a general
denial, and that the defamatory language alleged to have been used
by him is true. 9
Proponents of the "truth alone is an absolute defense" rule might feel
hopeful as a result of the quoted language until they realize that the real
holding of the case is that truth (whatever its legal effect may be) is
not raised as an issue under a general denial. Those same proponents
may be heartened by this language:
It will be noticed that the facts pleaded in the answer are pleaded,
not in mitigation of damages, but as justification for the charge.
The importance of this distinction must be borne in mind ...
When called to account, in order for him to justify this charge, he
must be able to prove the exact offense charged, and not some other
similar offense.9'
If, as I suspect, the rule in Oklahoma, although not clearly enunci-
ated, is that truth alone is an absolute defense, prospective plaintiffs
might bear in mind Timothy Sullivan's classic remark, 'Whats the use
of a libel suit? They might prove it on you."
2. PRIVILEGE
a. Absolute
Particular privileges are termed "absolute" because the existence of
such a privilege is a defense by itself and it matters not that defendant
may have defamed the plaintiff untruthfully, maliciously, viciously,
spitefully, etc".  Whether a situation is privileged at all and, if it is,
whether the privilege is an absolute one are questions of law for the
trial court. If the court decides that the particular occasion gives rise
to an absolute privilege, the circumstances being undisputed, there is
nothing to submit to a jury, the plaintiff is through, his case is dis-
missed, and his only remedy is an appeal.92
The Oklahoma statute" on privilege, being somewhat lengthy,
will be broken down and discussed in its component parts. The statute
begins: "A privileged publication or communication is one made: First.
In any legislative or judicial proceeding or any other proceeding
"117 Okla. 4,245 P. 46 (1926).
'Id. at 47.
90Vorhees v. Toney, 32 Okla. 570, 122 P. 552, 553 (1912).
91 Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P.2d 105 (1946).92 German-American Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 62 Okla. 39, 161 P. 815 (1916).
93 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1443 (1961).
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authorized by law." More defamation cases are brought by legislators
than are brought against them in their capacity as legislators. Such
situation stems logically from the fact that legislators always have enjoyed
an absolute privilege for anything said or done in connection with and
related to their official duties, whether such defamation occurs on the
floor of the legislative body, during committee hearings either at or
away from the legislative seat, official reprints of speeches, etc. This
absolute privilege, as is true of all privileges, has its ultimate origin
in public policy. William Howard Taft, while a Circuit Judge, stated
the policy argument in these words:
"The existence and extent of privilege in communications are
determined by balancing the needs and good of society against the
right of an individual to enjoy a good reputation when he has done
nothing which ought to injure it. The privilege should always cease
where the sacrifice of the individual right becomes so great that the
public good to be derived from it is outweighed."94
The same public policy extends to judges on all levels of thejudicial hierarchy the same absolute privilege in defamation cases as it
extends to legislators. The statute is broader and speaks of a judicial
proceeding, and not of judges alone. Thus, pleadings relevant to the
issues (all doubts being resolved in favor of the pleader),"5 proceedings
after judgment in a divorce action,96 witnesses whose testimony is perti-
nent to the issues,' parties and attorneys, 3 and pleadings and proceedings
before the State Industrial Commission" (now designated a Court) are all
absolutely privileged under the term "judicial proceeding." Very few,
if any, cases have turned only on the statutory phrase "or any other
proceeding authorized by law." It should be noted, however, that the
phrase is "authorized by law," and not "required by law.'..
The next part of the statute defining what are privileged communi-
cations reads as follows: "Second. In the proper discharge of an official
duty." Three problems, two arising from the language itself and one
from the decided cases, deserve some comment. If the Legislature, as a
matter of sound public policy, desired to grant the absolute privilege to
officials discharging their duties, why was it necessary to add the word
"proper" and what, if anything, does the word mean in this context?
If it means anything and is not just a matter of careless draftsmanship,
it would seem to qualify the privilege, and a "qualified" privilege is
certainly not an "absolute" one. Secondly, how far down in the bureau-
cratic hierarchy did the Legislature intend this defense of absolute privilege
to extend? The Governor of the State, certainly; the janitor who sweeps
out the office of the Governor?
In Hghes v. Bizzell, ° ' the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the
94 Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540 (6th cir. 1893).95 Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P.2d 105 (1946).96Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okla. 455, 177 P.2d 511 (1941).
7 ibid.
93 Ibid.
99 Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P.2d 105 (1946).
00 Holway v. World Pub. Co., 171 Okla. 306, 44 P.2d 881 (1935).
*01 89 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763 (1941).
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president of the University of Oklahoma and the dean of the university
medical school absolutely privileged, regardless of motives and alleged
falsity, for statements made to the Board of Regents concerning a
librarian of the medical school whom the defendants had fired. Pre-
sumably, the president and dean were in the proper discharge of an
official duty. Two years earlier the Supreme Court had reached the
same conclusion in a similar case."02 After having been directed by the
Board of Regents to report "any misconduct" or "any irregularity" of
any "teacher or employee of the university," the defendant president of
the university reported to the Board that the matron and the supervisor
of buildings and grounds had been arrested while together in a room.
This statement was held absolutely privileged as it was made in the
proper discharge of an official duty. More difficult to explain or reconcile
is the holding in Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital. 3 After saying that
the law as well as the dictates of common humanity imposed upon the
superintendent of a state hospital for the insane the duty of responding
to a letter from a patient's father inquiring about her condition, the
court held that responding to the inquiry was only qualifiedly privileged.
Surely the Supreme Court is not suggesting that the superintendent was
any less "in the proper discharge of an official duty" than the defendants
in the other two cases, nor that public policy decrees protection for
academicians but not for superintendents?
The third and final part of the statute defining what are absolutely
privileged communications reads as follows:
Third. By a fair and true report of any legislative or judicial or
other proceeding authorized by law, or anything said in the course
thereof, and any and all expressions of opinion in regard thereto,
and criticisms thereon, and any and all criticisms upon the official
acts of any and all public officers, except where the matter stated of
and concerning the official act done, or of the officer, falsely
imputes crime to the officer so criticised:
Justice Jackson, writing the majority opinion in the Fawcett case,
said: "Our statutory definition of 'privileged publication' (12 O.S. 1961
§ 1443) refers to the type of privilege commonly called absolute."'"
While the Justice has judicial precedent"'s for his statement, and while
his statement is undoubtedly true as applied to the three enumerated
sections of the statute, the privilege defined in the third section, supra,
cannot be called "absolute' to the same degree as the privilege defined
in the first two sections. There are certain limitations placed upon the
exercise of this privilege before it will be considered as absolute within
the statute. As one writer said:
Section 1443 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1951) in
part provides that criticisms of public officials are privileged
publications, but the privilege does not extend to falsely imputing
102 Sanford v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 P.2d 644 (1939).
10376 Okla. 229, 184 P. 946, 7 A.L.R. 895 (1919).
104 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962).
105 E.g., Sanford v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 .2d 644 (1939); German-
American Ins. Co. v. Huntley, 62 Okla. 39, 161 P. 815 (1917).
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crime to the officer so criticized. Case law in Oklahoma recognizes
an additional qualification: If the criticism is based on false alle-
gations of fact also appearing in the publication or if the criticism
consists of false accusations, then there is no privilege.
In both the Thompson case and the Kendall case, the court
recognizes that false imputation of crime is not the sole limitation
on the privilege. If the criticism is based on false accusations or on
false allegations of fact also appearing in the publication, there is
no privilege. This thus limited privilege is a substantial privilege
because, if the publisher raises the defense of privilege to criticize
public officials, the burden of proving the comment is a false
accusation or is based on false statements of fact is on the
plaintiff."'
The decisions reveal a tendency on the part of the court to be lenient
toward publication of criticisms of public officials, judicial proceedings,
and other matters of public interest" Such leniency does not extend,
however, to honest misstatements of fact. In this respect, it has been said:
It has been suggested that Oklahoma extends privilege to honest,
though mistaken, misstatements of fact made without negligence
concerning public officers. However, Holway v. World Publishing
Co., cited for this proposition does not support it. No authority
for the proposition seems to exist in Oklahoma. All the cases ...
stress the distinction between commenting on facts and misstating
facts.10
b. Conditional or Qualified
A privilege is said to be qualified or conditional in the sense that
for the defense to prevail, the alleged defamatory matter must have been
published without malice. Lack of malice, then, is a qualification or
condition attached to this privilege. The only statutory authority for the
existence of the qualified privilege is Section 1443 of Title 12 of the
Oklahoma Statutes (1961), which, after enumerating the situations
absolutely privileged, says: "In all cases of publication of matter not
privileged under this section, malice shall be presumed from the publi-
cation, unless the fact and the testimony rebut the same."
Whether lack of malice is the only requirement for the invocation
of the privilege, what "malice" means when used in a defamation case,
and the respective roles played by the judge and jury in connection with
this privilege are all confusing issues in many instances. The issue of
malice does not become a question for determination unless the parti-
cular factual situation is one which gives rise to the privilege. In a sense
it may be said there are two conditions to be met before the privilege
operates as a defense: (1) the factual situation is one giving rise to a
defense of qualified privilege; and (2) the privilege was not abused.
That is, defendant's statement was made without malice. On the first
condition it has been said:
This privilege arises in situations wherein the interest which
1° Note, 12 OKLA. L. REv. 300, 300-302 (1959).107 Note, 7 OKLA. L REV. 105 (1954).
10 d. at 112.
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the publisher is seeking to vindicate is considered to have an
intermediate degree of importance, so that the immunity conferred is
not absolute, but is conditioned upon publication for a proper
purpose in a reasonable manner."9
Because of the innumerable factual situations in which the privilege may
arise, no precise formulation of a rule can be made which will embrace all
such situations. As the court said in the Fawcett case:
Definitions of qualified privilege are usually very general in
nature and difficult of precise construction. See 53 C.J.S. Libel and
Slander § 89 et seq; 33 Am.Jur. Libel and Slander, Sec. 126. With
regard to privilege generally, it is said that '. . . in order to be
shielded ... on this ground, the communication must be a privileged
one uttered on a privileged occasion by a privileged person to one
within the privilege'; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 87. With regard
to qualified, or conditional privilege, it is said in 53 C.J.S. Libel
and Slander § 89, that 'It relates more particularly to private interests.
...' An examination of the cases in which the defense of qualified
privilege has been held applicable reveals that as a general rule
some special private relationship has been involved, such as fraternal,
fiduciary, business or professional1 0
Other Supreme Court cases"' have used language to the effect that the
privilege arises in a situation where the communication is one made in
good faith upon any subject matter in which the party communicating
has an interest, or in reference to which he has or honestly believes he
has a duty to perform, and which, without the occasion upon which it is
made, would be defamatory and actionable. It can be seen that the two
necessary conditions to the existence of the privilege, a proper occasion
for making the statement, and lack of malice in doing so, are closely
related and often difficult to separate, one from the other.
Malice has many meanings in law. Unfortunately, from the view-
point of simplicity, that statement is likewise true when applied to an
action for defamation, a particular meaning depending upon the pro-
cedural step which involves the issue of malice. As we have seen hereto-
fore, a plaintiff must plead malice but in proving such allegation, he
often need do no more than rely on the statutory presumption of malice.
Section 1445 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) provides: "An
injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable
motive for making it is shown." Thus, on the first procedural step,
malice means merely an absence of any justifiable motive. If the fact
of the publication itself or the testimony suggests the presence of a
justifiable motive, then plaintiff must prove that the defendant made
his statement with malice."1  Malice in this instance means "actual' 13 or
"express"'1  malice, a feeling of hatred, ill-will, spite, revenge, etc. This
same meaning of malice becomes important in yet another procedural
100 Note, 2 OKLA. L REV. 387 (1949).110 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962).
"I E.g., Hammett v. Hunter, 189 Okla. 455, 117 P.2d 511 (1941).
112 Harris v. Rich, 104 Okla. 120, 229 P. 1080 (1924).
113 Ibid.
114Missouri, K. &T. Ry. Co. v. Watkins, 77 Okla. 270, 188 P. 99 (1920).
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step, the prayer for and proof of punitive demages. 11
We can say in a very general way that the trial court decides whether
any privilege at all exists and if it does, whether the privilege is absolute
or conditional."' If the privilege is conditional, the court submits to the
jury for its determination whether the privilege was abused; that is,
whether the defendant made his statement with malice.17 The immediately
preceding statements presuppose, of course, no dispute as to the facts
and circumstances of the publication. If there were a dispute, the resolu-
tion of the facts would be questions for the jury under proper instructions
on malice and privilege given the jury by the trial court.
c. Fair Comment
Oklahoma has no specific statutory provision for the defense of Fair
Comment, and it is often regarded as a type of conditional privilege.
There are, however, significant differences between the two defenses
which should be noted briefly. Conditional privilege exists where the
particular factual situation is one giving rise to the privilege and the
publication is made without malice, although the facts stated are untrue.
Fair Comment exists only if the comment is a conclusion drawn from
facts which are true. Conditional privilege exists even though the plain-
tiff's reputation is directly assailed by the language. Fair Comment is
limited to opinions about plaintiff's work as an author, artist, public
official, etc., and personal imputations having no relation to such
opinions are not within the defense. As one writer said:
The privilege of fair comment extends to those who comment
upon matters of public interest. The comment must be based on
facts truly stated or generally known to the public.
Fair comment is not confined to a discussion of public officers
or candidates for office. It is much more extensive ...
According to the majority of courts, fair comment must never
take the form of a statement of fact. Comment may be distinguished
from fact by inquiring whether the statement should be construed
as being a conclusion drawn from facts stated....
The distinction between comment on public conduct and an
imputation of a personal nature is responsible for a great deal of
the confusion that exists in the law of libel."'
In a 1935 case, 19 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that matters of
public interest are legitimate subjects of fair comment and honest
criticism, no matter how severe its terms may be, and are not libelous.
It may be noted that both the quotation szpra and the Oklahoma
case refer to Fair Comment as applying to matters of "public" interest. No
inference should be drawn that the defense is limited to comments on
matters in which the public has an interest, as both these sources were
speaking of libel actions. That is, if the communication is to the public,
fair comment should apply only if the public has an interest in the
subject matter, but if I defame the plaintiff to a friend concerning a
1s523 OKLA. STAT. § 9 (1961).
116 Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 196 Okla. 597, 168 P.2d 105 (1946).
M Bland v. Lawyer-Cuff Co., 72 Okla. 128, 178 P. 885 (1919).11 Note, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 111-112 (1949).119 olway v. World Pub. Co., 171 Okla. 306,44 P.2d 881 (1935).
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matter of interest to the three of us only, I should have a defense of
fair comment if the prerequisites to its application are met.
3. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS Acr AND RmRACTION
Section 315 of Tide 47 of the United States Code provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he
shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, that
such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is
imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any
such candidate.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1958 held that the quoted
section of the Federal Communications Act granted immunity to a
television station from liability for defamatory statements made by a
candidate for a political office in a broadcast under the section, where
the statements2 were germane to the political issues discussed by the
candidates. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the decision
was upheld in a 5 to 4 decision, the court saying:
Agreeing with the state courts of North Dakota that Section 315
grants a licensee an immunity from liability for libelous material
it broadcasts, we merely read Section 315 in accordance with what
we believe to be its underlying purpose.
21
The Supreme Court decision renders more meaningful a statute passed by
the Oklahoma Legislature two years before the decision. That statute,
Section 1447.2 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961), provides in
part:
In no event, however, shall any owner, licensee, or operator,
or the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator
of such a television and/or radio station or network of stations be
held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered
over the facilities of such station or network by any candidate for
public office, where such statement is not subject to censorship or
control by reason of any Federal statute or any ruling or order of
the Federal Communications Commission made pursuant thereto.
The Oklahoma Legislature has provided for retraction by news-
papers, periodicals, and broadcasting stations, although the effect of a
retraction by the latter does not seem to have the same legal effect as a
retraction by the former two classes of defendants. Section 1446a of
Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) provides in effect that if an
article is published in good faith and under an honest mistake of the
facts, and the newspaper or periodical, on notice by the libeled person,
publishes a retraction in accord with the statutory requirements as to
size of type, location of the retraction, and number of times published,
120 Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, 89 N.W.
2d 102 (N.D. 1958).
121 Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, 360 U.S.
525, 535, 79 Sup. Ct. 1302, 1308, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1407, 1415 (1959).
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etc., the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover actual damages only. (The
word "actual" has not been interpreted, and it is assumed the Legislature
intended a retraction to eliminate any punitive damages.) The section does
not apply to a libel: (1) imputing unchastity to a woman; (2) to one
made maliciously or with premeditated intention and purpose to injure,
defame or destroy reputation; (3) to anonymous communications; nor
(4) to an article pertaining to a candidate for public office published
within three weeks of an election. The Oklahoma statute has never been
interpreted and its constitutionality is an open question. The Supreme
Court of California, a State with constitutional and statutory provisions
similar to Oklahoma's, upheld California's retraction statute in Werner v.
Southern California Associated Newspapers, 216 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1950).
As one writer said:
Perhaps the strongest argument against the validity of these
statutes is that provisions, such as those found in the Oklahoma
and California Constitutions, which hold persons responsible for
the abuse of their right to speak and write freely on all subjects,
create an absolute right to civil indemnity for injuries to reputation
through speech and print. "
Another argument could be based on Article V, Section 51 of the
Oklahoma Constitution which provides: "The Legislature shall pass no
law granting to any association, corporation, or individual any exclusive
rights, privileges, or immunities within this State."
In Section 1447.5 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961),
the Legislature provided for the broadcast, upon demand, of a true
statement after the broadcast of an untruth, but the Legislature did not
indicate what the legal effect of such retraction would be. Presumably, it
can go only to mitigation of damages, as Section 1447.3, passed by the
same Legislature, provides: "In any action for damages for any defamatory
statement published in or uttered as a part of a television and/or radio
broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed such actual and/or
punitive damages as he has alleged and proved."
SLANDER
Although there is no need for two torts of defamation and no
rational basis for a compartmentalization of one basic wrong, the Okla-
homa Legislature continues, as it has since statehood, to make certain
distinctions between Libel and Slander. No arguments need be adduced
to prove that only one tort of defamation should suffice. The truth of
the proposition is self evident. That the Legislature and the Oklahoma
courts recognize this truth can be demonstrated by at least two facts: (1)
only one section of the entire statutory title on defamation concerns
slander alone, and that section merely defines the tort; (2) the only
difference between slander and libel lies in the form of publication which
the defamation takes, and perhaps in the court-devised test of slander
per se as opposed to the test of libel per se.
Section 1442 of Tide 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes (1961) provides:
Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel,
which:
12'Note, 3 OKLA. L. REv. 426, 428 (1950).
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1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted,
convicted or punished for crime.
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, con-
tagious or loathsome disease.
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession,
trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification
in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly
requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office,
profession, trade or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its
profit.
4. Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or,
5. Which, by natural consequences, causes actual damages.
Any first year law student will recognize that the first four of these
instances listed, with certain changes, are merely dedaratory of what
finally came to be slander per se at common law. With this knowledge of
what constituted slander per se at common law, a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute would be that the Legislature intended the first
four paragraphs to constitute slander per se and thus actionable without
allegation and proof of special damages, and intended that actual damages
must be alleged and proved in the situation listed in paragraph 5.
The courts, however, have not spoken with such clarity. In Findley
v. Wilson," the Oklahoma Supreme Court in defining "slander per se"
said that the meaning of "per se" is taken alone; in itself; by itself; and
that words which expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or
obloquy, or tend to deprive him of public confidence, or injure him in
his occupation are slanderous per se. It will be remembered that this
sounds very much like the statutory effects which libel must take and
sounds, moreover, like the test of what is libelous per se. The court has
left us in a quandry as to what is slander per se in Oklahoma. Several
questions should be raised: (1) Is the court trying to establish a single
test for defamation per se, one which will apply equally to libel or
slander, namely; a defamation is per se if it does not require the
pleading and proof of extrinsic circumstances to show a defamatory
meaning? Such simplicity of concepts might be admirable, but if this
is what slander per se means, why the statutory listing of essentially the
old common law categories of slander per se? The Legislature could
have provided merely, "Slander is a false and unprivileged publication
other than libel." (2) Is the court trying to say that slander per se must
meet the test for libel per se, that is, the slander must be plain on its face
and in addition, to be slander per se, the slander must fall within one of
the four statutory classes? This would establish a more difficult test
than for the historically more wrongful tort of libel and would seem
an unreasonable requirement. (3) Lastly, is Findley just an old decision
that the court has never had occasion to overrule and is slander per se
the reasonable interpretation suggested earlier? No one knows the answer
and we will get a clear-cut answer to what is slander per se, if at all,
only when the following type of case is appealed to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court: Plaintiff is defamed in a form which clearly is slander
13 115 Okla. 280, 242 P. 565 (1926).
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and not libel; he neither alleges nor proves special damages; the defama-
tion is plain and unambiguous; but the slander does not fall within one
of the first four instances listed in Section 1442.
Or perhaps all the issues raised throughout this article will mira-
culously become moot by the adoption of Justice Black's views on the
First Amendment Absolutes.
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